As others, I continue to refresh my news sources for Kyrgyz details. While reading all I could find, I noticed that Sarah’s post was quite unique. What struck me was how Registan can’t help but be the anti-FP blog. To be more specific, the fact that FP has two stories that seem to see the same data and draw different conclusions:
It’s not a revolution – Joshua Keating
Kyrgyzstan’s Analog Revolution – Evgeny Morozov
Keating’s piece does include this fair representation of events:
Outside observers have fallen into this trap before, Quinn-Judge, who was Time magazine’s Moscow bureau chief from 1996-2006, noted. “The ‘Tulip Revolution’ wasn’t a revolution. It was we journalists who called it that, or at least allowed our editors to call it that, who are to blame for that distortion of history.”
“It was a fairly well-crafted, concerted extra-constitutional reshuffle of the government whereby some key former members of the government pushed out the government.”
Quinn-Judge says the discontent with Bakiyev’s government that led to today’s events has been building for weeks, and was driven less by political repression than by bread and butter issues.
I understand that the Tulip Revolution had little in common with the other color-coded movements, but wouldn’t the events in Kyrgyzstan today be more like the “real thing?” I don’t assume that the Russian Revolutions (yes, more than one) of the teens of the twentieth century were devoid of violence and senseless looting. Some journalists point to the looting and say, “Not a Revolution,” that it’s being fueled more by hungry thugs looking to steal flatscreens from the parliament hall. Might that just be the consequence of the failure of the rule of law? That failure itself IS the revolution’s beginning, no?
Morozov’s piece accepts that it is a Revolution, and also that it is as I said – more like the real thing. However, part of his evidence goes in direct opposition to Sarah’s piece – targeting the lack of social media and networking buzz.
In short: why is there no Twitter revolution in Kyrgyzstan? Becuase there is no one to hype it up.
I am in agreement, but I think we should be more suspicious of those situations that ARE hyped up, like his model of the Iranian Election twitter blow up. Look to Tehrangeles and the Californian Iranian population first. The same might be said of any and all newsworthy Armenian stories. Not that there is no news, but that the news does not proclaim itself on FOX, MSNBC, CNN, etc. The news that is important to its viewers – that is the stuff that makes the news crawler and commentary shows.
What Kyrgyz diaspora is going to come to the defense of the situation? Perhaps the hordes of Kyrgyz workers in Russia – but they might be too busy dodging punches from Russian nationalists.
Morozov goes on to remind us of his expertise…
I’ve also omitted any discussion about the regional dimensions to this revolution, for the example, the split between Kyrgyzstan’s North and South and how both regions were communicating with the capital, and how what happened in each reinforced/undermined developments elsewhere. I’m well aware of that.
Well aware, but not sure it has anything to do with your article’s thesis? If someone wanted to comment on whether or not these events were a Revolution, they’d better go back to 1991 at least, and chart the rise and fall of various power zones in the region, and in the various oblasts inside the country itself.
I myself am waiting to see Kazakhstan’s and Uzbekistan’s reaction to this — and mayhaps Tajikistan’s as well?
This post was written by...
Michael Hancock-Parmer – author of 158 posts on Registan.net.
Michael earned an MA in Central Eurasian Studies in 2011 and remains a student at Indiana University pursuing a dual PhD in Russian History and Central Eurasian Studies. He served 6 months in the Peace Corps in Uzbekistan in 2005. After the events in Andijan and the subsequent closure of the program, he served 2 years in southern Kazakhstan, returning to the Midwest in 2007. His general area of interest is on post-Timur Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, centered on the Syr Darya river valley.
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{ 12 comments }
Just saw this item on the Washington Post website that may be of interest regarding US interests:
Thanks for that Laurence, very interesting. Do you happen to have a link?
http://www.sott.net/articles/show/206376-CIA-s-Tulip-Revolution-in-Kyrgyzstan-thrown-out-by-the-people-who-s-next-
Well, that’s an interesting report, even if only 1/2 of it is true…and it brings Iran into the mix, as well. Could Bakiev launch a civil war from the South such as happened in Tajikistan? or just fade away like Akayev in exile? Would Kyrgyz revolutionaries post captured CIA documents on the internet, as Iranians did after the 1979 hostage crisis? I bet some more Registan readers have some ideas…
Considering the absence of large scale warlords in Kyrgyzstan and the fact that the new government is reportedly in control of the military and police it’d be difficult for him to start a war.
As for the CIA, I can’t really see why. There may be a feeling in Kyrgyzstan that the U.S supported someone that the people hated (with some justification) but I can’t see Kyrgyzstan doing something guaranteed to infuriate the U.S in such a blatant manner. Kyrgyzstan is actually one of the poorer Central Asian nations, and with the U.S military so interested in renting bases it simply would be bad business.
I don’t think that the opposition and protesters are ideologically sophisticated enough to see or be aware at the moment of the link between the economic and social morass in Kyrgyzstan and the policies of the international financial institutions in the country since the nineties. Because it should be the latter’s offices who should be wrecked and their twat consultants who should be booted out of the country really.
As for Bakiev, he’s a different and tougher character that Akayev. Akayev was rather an effeminate intellectual who was cut off from reality by his entourage, starting with greedy wife and son-in-law. When people rose he was sincerely at total loss I think. Bakiev is more a muzhik: a bloke from the province who went bottom-up.
The protesters might not but the elites certainly are.
A few years ago I read a UN report about civil wars. One thing that stood out to me and still does today is that 500 well-armed men can sustain a civil war for several years. In the Kyrgyz context of clan rivalries, arrest warrants, and revenge, I can easily see the possiblity of Bakiev rallying 200-500 men and arming them.
I am not predicting this, just pointing out that the there is a fairly low starting thresh hold for something that in the future will be called a “civil war.” I sincerely hope the people of KG does not have the stomach for this, but remember, there are hurt and dead people on both sides. It was not just protesters that were killed. The calls for action and revenge will be strong on both sides of the this.
What *might* exacerbate north-south tensions is, if the interim government or who- or whatever succeeds it, starts to systematically push southerners out of government and administration or if southerners living in Bishkek deliberately become the target of violence or harrassment. This is more or less what basically happened in Dushanbe in the ’90s. It’s theoretically possible. So far, there are not signs, that this is happening though.
Bollocks. I don’t think that the protesters think about genealogical trees or that this in any way determines the chance for a civil war. Rather, I believe that people in the south might be genuinely shocked by the grim turn that things have taken in Bishkek and that this has more effect than whether someone has a Dungan, Kalmyk or Udmurt parent really.
Well in that case I think I score lower on bollocks scale than you do because you just confirm what I wanted to say: the support to this or that party is not determined by genealogy, while you intially suggested that it did.
Ethnic tensions might play a role, few non-Kyrgyz people can make it high in the government.