ISAF Reporting and the IED Numbers Shuffle

by Dan Smock on 10/17/2011 · 3 comments

In looking at  ISAF’s data for the months of August and September, they summarize IED discoveries, etc., but only graph the numbers of actual IED explosions/attacks. This is a significant shift in their reporting, as they used to report all IED events, at least for the last three years or so. Additionally, some of the data that they are reporting is a little difficult to interpret. Below are some of the data points where things aren’t exactly readily understandable in ISAF’s reporting.

Differences in insurgent IED CIVCAS numbers

Both these reports would appear to be year to date (YTD) data, which makes the percentage difference between insurgent caused civilian casualties (CIVCAS) from the month of August to September a little striking.

  • August YTD: 70% of all insurgent CIVCAS caused by IEDs
  • September YTD: 55% of all insurgent CIVCAS caused by IEDs

This 15% reduction in casualties caused by IEDs is potentially due to more IED discoveries rather than detonations, but it could also mean that, due to the increased risk of IEDs, that fewer Afghans are traveling those areas where IED strikes are likely. Fewer possible targets would also result in fewer casualties. It’s impossible to draw any real conclusion as to the reason for the reduction from the data presented.

Percentage increase of IED attacks vs. total number of attacks

First, a look at the percentage increase of IED attacks YTD 2011 vs. 2010 for the same time period (January to August/September):

  • August 2011: 5% increase in IED strikes from the previous year
  • September 2011: 6% increase in IED strikes from the previous year

This is despite the fact that there were approximately 130 fewer IED attacks in the month of September vs. the month of August. The conclusion that has to be drawn here (in the absence of data showing otherwise) is that the number of attacks during September 2011 was actually higher than it was in 2010, causing a 1% increase in the number of attacks YTD. So while month-to-month this year’s numbers per month are decreasing, year-to-year there are still more IED attacks occurring.

Percentage of discovered IEDs

ISAF makes this assertion about the August data:

“The rate of IEDs that are found and cleared without detonation is 55 percent of total planted IEDs, an improvement over last year’s rate of 45 percent.”

Where this could be potentially confusing is that this sounds like we know how many IEDs have been planted in the country. If we know that, why aren’t we finding and clearing 100% of those IEDs without detonation? I realize that this is likely a short-sighted conclusion based on incomplete data, but it raises the potential for error in the analysis when the whole picture isn’t being reported.

This metric coupled with the previous figures on attacks is that, on the whole, while discoveries are increasing, so are attacks. More finds, more detonations. I’m still looking for the win, here.

ISAF caused CIVCAS

Since this is actually a lot more important than how ISAF reports IEDs, I contemplated putting it at the top, but I’m saving the truly depressing data for last. In August’s report, ISAF states:

“ISAF caused civilian casualties are 20 percent higher in 2011 (January through August) than during the same period in 2010.”

20. Percent. Higher. But then in September, this:

“ISAF-caused civilian casualties for the period January-September 2011 are unchanged from the comparable 2010 period despite a substantial increase in the number of troops.”

Which has to mean that ISAF managed to kill/wound fewer civilians in September of 2011 vs. September of 2010. Like fewer on an order of magnitude fewer. When ISAF goes from a 20% increase to a +/- 0% change in just 30 days for YTD comparison, that’s a substantial difference worth noting. And probably better for the Afghans. The good news is that per capita we’re managing to kill/wound fewer Afghan civilians. I’m not trying to be unfair: I know that ISAF  works very hard to keep civilian casualties to a minimum. This is a war, after all, and war is, if nothing else, really messy.

Reporting all IED events over the course of time is a strong indicator for the state of security in Afghanistan. Since more civilians than ISAF personnel are killed by IEDs, the fact that there more of them being planted and detonated in the country means that potentially the Afghan civilian population is actually in more danger, not less.

The impact to the population that exists for even the threat of an IED also has a signficant impact on the population as a whole. I know that if on my drive to my local Target I ran an increased risk of having my car blown up, I might actually travel that route less frequently. So even in the absence of actual attacks, just the threat of an IED is enough to change personal behaviors. Which, in Insurgentland, is a win. Even if they’re losing.


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This post was written by...

– author of 15 posts on Registan.net.

Having spent time in Iraq as part of Uncle Sam's 9/11 World Tour as an infantry and civil affairs officer, Dan Smock is currently employed in Afghanistan as a civilian. His day job is way cooler than he deserves, and while he wants (desperately) to believe in the ISAF mission, he's pretty certain that all we're doing is lapping the drain. However, there are bright spots here, and he tries to find them when he can. He regularly blogs at It's Always Sunny in Kabul. You can reach him my email here.

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{ 3 comments }

Don Bacon October 17, 2011 at 1:04 pm

Just as when the ISAF staff officer dropped by recently, the military loves to focus on minutia, in this case meaningless numbers, and avoid the big picture. This is true particularly when the whole deal is headed south, as AfPak has done for years and continues to do.

It isn’t as if they didn’t have an alternative approach spelled out in detail in the COIN bible. Army Field Manual 3-24 was famously ‘authored’ by General Petraeus but thence totally neglected, except for a stab by the departed General McChrystal. Here are some excerpts, none of them being the numbers of mines planted, destroyed or exploded.

FM 3-24 COIN
Legitimacy Is the Main Objective
1-113. The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government.

ASSESSMENT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
5-90. Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of an operation (FMI 5-0.1). Assessment precedes and is integrated into every operations-process activity and entails two tasks:
* Continuously monitoring the current situation (including the environment) and progress of the operation.
* Evaluating the operation against established criteria.

DEVELOPING MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
5-91. Assessment requires determining why and when progress is being achieved . . . Traditionally, commanders use discrete quantitative and qualitative measurements . . . However, the complex nature of COIN operations makes progress difficult to measure. Subjective assessment at all levels is essential to understand the diverse and complex nature of COIN problems. It is also needed to measure local success or failure against the overall operation’s end state.

5-93. The two most common types of assessment measures are measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs).

Table 5-7. Example progress indicators
* Acts of violence
* Dislocated civilians
* Human movement and religious attendance
* Presence/activity of businesses
* Level of agricultural activity
* Presence or absence of associations
* Participation in elections
* Government services available
* Freedom of movement of people, goods and communications
* Tax revenue
* Industry exports
* Employment/unemployment rate
* Availability of electricity
* Specific attacks on infrastructure
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf

So if you’re reading this, ISAF staff, why are the MOEs and MOPs AWOL like an ANA soldier? Huh?

Reply

Dishonesty October 17, 2011 at 4:56 pm

Its simply,for example:

Toolan, who assumed command over the U.S. and British forces in Helmand in mid-March, said he was cautiously optimistic about the overall security situation in the province. He said his forces were successfully interdicting significant amounts of drugs and squeezing the Taliban’s ability to recruit fighters or carry out large-scale new attacks. By this time last year, for instance, militants had carried out 54 successful IED strikes while coalition forces had found and dismantled just 76 (=130 IED). This year, by contrast, there has only been 42 IED attacks while coalition forces have safely dealt with 120 of the bombs. (=162 IED)

http://www.nationaljournal.com/snipers-another-threat-to-u-s-forces-in-southern-afghanistan-20110714

Yep ,thats progress

Reply

Dishonesty October 26, 2011 at 6:03 pm

Tremendous success in peace effort:
“We supply anywhere between 7 and 12 million rounds of ammunition a month to all the coalition forces within Helmand province,” said Staff Sgt. Brian Taylor, the RC(SW) logistics ammunition chief for II MEF C-4, and a Dayton, Ohio, native.

http://www.dvidshub.net/news/79012/ammo-movers-keep-coalition-weapons-locked-and-loaded#.Tqh_mHIa_Lo

Really peaceful Helmand

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