While Central Asia’s international political profile has risen considerably since 2001, it has primarily been seen in the West through the prism of Afghanistan. The policies of Western governments towards Central Asia as a whole and as individual states have widely fluctuated, but in almost every case, been heavily shaped by policies toward Afghanistan. US and ISAF Afghanistan policy has been short-sighted and messy enough, making policy toward Central Asia even moreso.

In recent years, Central Asia’s governments have backslid, becoming more authoritarian and less able to provide services to all of society. This contributes to greater risks for instability in the future.

How much responsibility do Western countries, particularly the United States, have for this situation?

According to Alexander Cooley, who writes, “…the West has left a trail of repression, graft and unfulfilled commitments to Central Asia’s fledgling civil society,” a lot.

Cooley makes two big claims about how the US and ISAF campaign in Afghanistan has affected Central Asia:

1. Security assistance has made Central Asian states more authoritarian and corrupt
2. The drawdown from Afghanistan will magnify these effects

I acknowledge the possibility that Cooley is referring to a very small, slightly more than trivial, increase when using the adjective “more” to describe the changes in authoritarianism and corruption in Central Asia caused by western security assistance. However, it seems unlikely that he means “slightly more than trivial” for a few reasons. First, why bother writing about it in anything other than a theoretical way if that is indeed the case? Second, he does not write about these changes in the way one might expect were he describing small changes; the language suggests a qualitative and quantitative levels of authoritarianism and corruption rather than describing, for example, how western assistance creates new opportunities for the pre-existing corruption. Third, the tone suggests he means something big.

Perhaps the strong evidence is in his forthcoming book, because the case made in the article linked above is extraordinarily thin.

Before even looking at the evidence, this case should be approached with extreme skepticism. As a thought experiment, imagine there had been no war in Afghanistan. Would we expect any of the Central Asian governments to be qualitatively different in any perceivable way? Would corruption or authoritarianism be significantly less pronounced? To say they would be dramatically understates the agency these governments have.

Similarly, even with the war in Afghanistan, if western security assistance is a noteworthy contributor to increased corruption and authoritarianism, we should expect the effects to be more pronounced where that assistance is and has been greatest. It is hard to measure these things objectively, but looking at Freedom House and Transparency International scores or purely qualitative assessments of corruption and freedom as levels of US security assistance over the last decade shows no clear patterns. Uzbekistan was a little better in the early part of the decade when US security assistance was greatest and did most of its slide during the period of poor relations with the US. Kyrgyzstan has slid on corruption rankings and fallen and bounced back on freedom rankings. There is a lot more economy in explaining these changes by referring to the features of the particular governments than there is by pointing to US security assistance as the cause.¹

So, Cooley has big evidentiary hurdles — ones he sets up himself by writing at the outset that, “Western security assistance has made the Central Asian states more authoritarian and more corrupt” — to clear to show a causal relationship between security assistance and increased corruption and authoritarianism. He simply does not clear them.

On promotion of political and civil rights, he writes,

The K2 eviction prompted Western officials to accept the Central Asian governments’ insistence that engagement on security issues was now antithetical with promoting political freedoms.

To support this claim, he points out that the US toned down criticism of President Bakiev in 2007 to prevent the eviction of Manas, that human rights organizations complain that the US will not raise rights issues with certain Central Asian governments because of security relationships, and that the EU addresses human rights issues in EU-Central Asia dialogues. This simply does not cut it. Yes, the US has toned down criticism at times, and some agencies are particularly prone to downplaying concerns over rights. However, it is incorrect to say that the US does not raise these issues, as some human rights organizations claim (though this argument is hard to refute without details). Whether or not this engagement makes any difference, especially in a systematic way, is an entirely different question, as is whether or not US officials are eager to bring these issues up. But the mountain of rights related reports and certifications required for security assistance required by Congress make it impossible not to bring these issues up. Is it really that hard to find people in government with knowledge of these negotiations or who can describe the far more complicated story on trying to promote rights and maintain security assistance agreements?

On corruption, Cooley describes the rent-seeking around the Northern Distribution Network and the massive corruption in fuel sales for the Transit Center at Manas. He is entirely right that western, mostly US, engagement on transit into Afghanistan has created opportunities for corruption for local elites. And he is right that the payments are likely to increase as equipment is moved out of Afghanistan on the NDN. Yes, this is “more” corruption quantitatively, but is it qualitatively? One’s mileage may vary, but any and all resources coming into the region from outside are likely to have a chunk taken out due to corruption.²

Cooley never directly supports his claim that western security assistance has made Central Asia more authoritarian. The closest he comes is when he writes,

…the Obama Administration in January of this year lifted a ban on providing military assistance and its financing to the Uzbek government, opening the way to transfers of material that is as likely to be used to target domestic opponents as it is for its publicly stated purpose of guarding these supply lines.

Cooley, like other analysts of US security assistance, would be better served by taking a look at what security assistance has been given and what is on offer. Vague reference to “material” muddies the water. Uzbekistan wants all kinds of military equipment, but what is actually being offered does not include weapons and ammunition. Specific items include night-vision goggles, thermal imaging sensors for border posts, and body armor, and it will probably also include things like computers, desks, certain kinds of vehicles, and similar equipment being moved back out of Afghanistan. It explicitly does not include expansion of training. I guess all of these things could be used against domestic opponents or the public, but is that really such a significant risk? These are not the tools of repression currently used, and to claim that this increases authoritarianism is making a mountain out of a molehill. Again, is it really that hard to find people, especially at State or on Congressional staffs, who have worked these issues and can provide another perspective to add something to the story?

I agree that US policy has been lacking in Central Asia over the last decade. There have been strategic missteps and missed opportunities. Western governments, particularly the US and German, have too often let themselves lose sight of the importance of human rights to the long-term security and stability of Central Asia in the pursuit of short-term goals in Afghanistan. Human rights organizations play an important role in reminding western governments that Central Asian governments are headed the wrong direction, and academics play an important role in providing inputs to orient policy in better directions. However, in either of these cases, that role is undermined by making thinly-supported arguments that overstate the effects of security assistance on Central Asian governments.

Uzbekistan’s popular Axborot news program showed that even Islom Karimov must be censored if he speaks about subjects too sensitive for Uzbekistan’s national mentality. According a report originally published by Ozodlik (in Uzbek), Axborot cut a portion of comments Karimov delivered while meeting with President Putin in Moscow. During his talk with Putin, Karimov brought up birth rates and the need to prevent population from growing too quickly for the economy to keep up.

Axborot reported Karimov as saying,

The population of Uzbekistan is now nearly 30 million people. We are doing all we can so that the growth of our population corresponds to the growth of our economy so that future generations can live better than us, be smarter than us, and live happier lives than us. If one looks through this lens, our children must grow up so that they are no more worse off than those of the most developed countries.

What he actually said, according to he transcript of the meeting available from the Kremlin in Russian and in English was,

Uzbekistan’s population today is nearly 30 million people. I am not saying that the population is growing rapidly: unlike Russia, we are doing everything we can to make sure that the population growth rate does not exceed 1.2 to 1.3.

It is our firm belief that given the present situation and our current prospects and resources, which include first of all water, territory and arable land, our main challenge is to provide everything our people need, and most importantly to make sure that the future generation lives better than we do, and is smarter and happier than we are. From this perspective, we try to use public campaigns, education and healthcare to ensure that population growth corresponds to economic growth. [Если смотреть через эту призму, мы и в этом вопросе через пропаганду, агитацию, медицину пытаемся создать условия, чтобы темпы роста нашего населения соответствовали темпу роста экономики..] Our children should enjoy the same standards of living as children in the most developed countries. This is the Kremlin’s translation. I’ve inserted the Russian original after the second to last sentence.

Ferghana speculates that Axborot wanted to avoid even hinting at birth control, a taboo subject, and especially at anything that might suggest the government does indeed engage in a campaign of forced contraception or sterilization.

Placing Karimov’s comment in the context of how Uzbekistan’s government works, this looks as close to an admission that the state is indeed engaged in suppressing the birthrate as one could ever expect. For every one of the government’s sinister policies, there is a tame explanation from the highest levels of government. If forced labor in cotton is just “children helping their families earn an income,” “job training,” or “a peculiarity of national culture,” then it’s not hard to interpret a “public awareness, education, and healthcare” campaign to keep birthrates low to be referring to a campaign going back more than a decade that forces contraception and sterilization on women in rural areas.

Alisher Usmanov, the world’s richest libel tourist and oh yeah Uzbek-turned-Russian magnate of extractive industries, stands to profit massively from the upcoming Facebook IPO:

As other investors were demanding tough terms, he said in an interview this week, he and his Russian business associates were willing to buy almost 10 percent of the company while giving up the voting rights on those shares to Facebook’s founder and chief executive, Mark Zuckerberg.

Now the Russian-led investments of less than $900 million, made through two entities, Mail.ru and Digital Sky Technologies, will be worth more than $6 billion, based on the midpoint of the $34 to $38 price range that Facebook’s bankers have set for the stock.

This makes for kind of an interesting contrast with Facebook co-founded Eduardo Saverin, who recently renounced his U.S. citizenship and stands to save over $100 million in capital gains taxes from the upcoming IPO. Doing so will, in all likelihood, mean he’ll never be allowed back into the United States.

Usmanov, as a non-US citizen, doesn’t face these constraints. Considering the many accusations about Usmanov’s shady financial dealings with Tashkent (some of which were levied by our old friend Craig Murray, which prompted a ridiculous libel suit by Usmanov’s lawyers), it’s a really striking that a probable criminal like Usmanov can travel to the U.S. freely (as best I know he doesn’t face any travel restrictions), but a non-criminal like Saverin will probably be barred from ever traveling to the U.S. again because of a tax loophole.

Oh yeah, and Usmanov also owns notable stakes in Zynga as well. So basically, he knows everything you do on Facebook and Farmville.

President Karimov meeting with the President of FIFA in his favorite suit and with his favorite pencils at his side.

Does he have hundreds of this same suit and tie or what?

The following announcement was posted at the request of Awareness Projects International

From May 20-21 of 2012, leaders from around the world will be gathering in Chicago for The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) important diplomatic summit hosted by President Barack Obama. Chicago is the first American city other than Washington DC to host a NATO summit. About 2,000 journalists from around the world are expected in Chicago to document the event.

President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov will be attending the summit. Given the importance and high class of this summit, and presence of the Uzbek tyrant, it provides AwarenssProjects.Org an opportunity to demonstrate against child labor in Uzbekistan, demand the end of exploitation of children in Uzbekistan’s cotton industry and to bring awareness about the human rights situation and the cotton industry’s result in the environmental catastrophe of the Aral Sea in Uzbekistan.

This protest is being organized by Awareness Projects International and sponsored by the International Labor Rights Forum and Human Rights Watch.

For more information, contact Dmitriy Nurullayev.

Earlier this week, Small Wars Journal published an article by Matthew Stein, a research analyst currently working at the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, discussing the role of videos recorded and posted by citizen bystanders in the information battle to control the narrative over the police’s violent crackdown on protesters in Zhanaozen last December. Stein’s article provides a fairly straightforward summary of the different videos showing the police firing on protesters and how the ways in which the government has built a narrative for the incident. On the significance of the appearance of these videos, Stein writes,

Finally, the significance of these videos is that the people of Zhanaozen were able to get information on the incident out into social media despite the government’s control over access. People using social media to publicize incidents that might not otherwise be noticed is not a new trend, as can be seen from worldwide events in 2011. However, this is the most noteworthy example from Kazakhstan, much less Central Asia, of this happening. Due to the effect that the first video (Zhana Ozen 3) had, it will not be the last time that people in Kazakhstan document an incident on video and make it available for a wide audience.

Dissemination of documentary evidence without state filtering is a fairly recent phenomenon in Central Asia, though some, including myself, would argue that Kazakhstan is late to this, at least in regard to high profile events, especially compared to Kyrgyzstan, where there are several earlier examples, including 2010′s overthrow of President Bakiev and especially the ethnic violence in Osh. More importantly though, the significance of information going unfiltered into social media and out to a wide audience is overstated. As internet use increases in Central Asia, it should come as no surprise that some of these people use the internet to distribute content like the Zhanaozen videos.

In his final paragraph, Stein points to the emergence of a struggle between state and society to control the narratives around controversial events. There is a story to be told about how these authoritarian states respond to erosion of their information dominance, but in many ways, it is singularly uninteresting. Almost every state tries to shape narratives, and in Central Asia, the state controls the story by keeping political groups, social and religious groups, and the media on a short leash. Central Asian governments have stepped up some restrictions and monitoring of social media. Security services are adept enough at disrupting off-line political activity planned online, and governments are finding ways to convince people to avoid the internet.

Like my colleagues here at Registan, I have found expectations of a Central Asian spring in the near term or the assumption that the Arab Spring would have a measurable impact on Central Asia to be based on fundamental misunderstandings of the region. Political culture matters. A lot. Government plays a critical role in nurturing fear, distrust, and political apathy, but their success is aided enormously by their political opponents and the societies they govern perpetuating this culture themselves. And research on Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan suggests that at least in the near term, the internet has exacerbated these problems.

Of course, all of these things — the relationships between state and society, the discussions within society, and political and cultural attitudes — are dynamic. Timelines extend well beyond the near term. The documentation and discussion in social media of events like Zhanaozen or ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan is important because it preserves events. Stein is looking in the wrong place for meaning. The real significance of this documentation and presentation is in how and whether it changes society’s modes and norms for discussing sensitive political, social, and cultural topics and how those changes subsequently change political culture. The state’s reaction is just a continuation of a long-running dynamic.

I do not find the future as bleak as we sometimes make it sound when we focus on the near term. It is, of course, incorrect to characterize any popular uprising as entirely reliant on the internet. Twitter, facebook, etc. can only catalyze offline factors. Trends like the popular revival of Islam, failures of economies to meet rising expectations, the growth of ethno-linguistic nationalism, and demographic shifts all suggest heightened chances for political instability in the medium- to long-term. It is difficult to look at how the internet is being used in Central Asia at present and not see it playing an organizing and catalyzing role in the future should these trends keep drifting Central Asia toward instability. However, it is absolutely impossible at present to predict how or when the internet will play an appreciably important role. The only thing that is certain is that more clarity on these questions comes from focusing on discussions and practices within society than from monitoring the state-society dynamic.

The Cotton Campaign has sent a letter to Hillary Clinton to urge the Uzbek government to end the use of forced labor in the cotton industry. The letter (PDF) provides a good summary of the issues at hand in this year’s determination of Uzbekistan’s status in the State Department’s annual trafficking in persons (TIP) report.

The State Department’s 2011 Trafficking in Persons Report identified negligible progress by the government of Uzbekistan to end the practice of forced labor, and it identified the government quota system as a root cause of the forced labor system of cotton production. Uzbekistan remained on the Tier 2 Watch List in 2011 for the fourth consecutive year, presumably because the Uzbek government had “a written plan that, if implemented, would constitute making significant efforts to comply with the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act’s (TVPRA) minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is devoting sufficient resources to implement the plan” (22 USC § 7107). However, according to Ambassador George Krol, with whom we met recently at the Global Chiefs of Missions Conference, the Uzbek government has not accomplished much. The 2011 TIP report also recommended that the government of Uzbekistan invite a mission of the ILO to monitor the 2011 cotton harvest. This did not happen.

The letter argues that Uzbekistan’s lack of progress means it must be dropped to Tier III status. The only thing the government has done since last year’s determination was to declare its intent to police itself, which is really no different than what it said it would do last year. The only thing, the letter says, that can count as the type of legitimate progress that would justify keeping Uzbekistan at the Tier II Watchlist status would be Uzbekistan’s government inviting the International Labor Organization unfettered access to evaluate the 2012 cotton harvest.

The standard the Cotton Campaign sets in the letter is very reasonable. One could even argue it is generous to Uzbekistan’s government as it makes no specific demand for an immediate government response and even provides an opportunity for it to (unconvincingly) claim the ILO’s findings to be sobering and eye-opening.

That said, Uzbekistan’s government rarely budges in meaningful ways on human rights issues and can be expected to continue pushing its usual arguments on forced child labor. But, something has to give. The law on TIP tier determinations requires forward progress to avoid falling to a lower tier. The reporting of human rights organizations and independent media outlets absolutely clear that both children and adults are forced to work in the cotton fields and that the reasons for this are a direct result of state control of the cotton economy and orders from no lower than the prime minister to mobilize laborers to meet quotas. Additionally, there is little to suggest that Uzbekistan’s government has done anything so far this year beyond what it did last year to address child labor.

Great effort surely is and will be poured into avoiding a downgrade, but it is very difficult to see how one can be avoided giving the requirements of the law. Even with a downgrade, Uzbekistan’s importance to the NDN would certainly result in a waver of the sanctions that come with Tier III status. Nevertheless, Uzbekistan’s government would take the downgrade as an insult, and it would be paid for in other areas of the bilateral relationship.

On Tuesday, I reported on the Susan G. Komen Uzbekistan Race for the Cure and the apparent relationships between Susan G. Komen for the Cure in the US and various charities run by Gulnora Karimova, including Fund Forum. A representative from Komen contacted me yesterday to correct what she described as inaccuracies in that original report.

Komen’s representative stressed that their agreement is with, and only with, the National Breast Cancer Association of Uzbekistan, and that under the agreement, they provide technical assistance and allow some level of co-branding. They emphasized that they believe the National Breast Cancer Association of Uzbekistan to be a “credible organization doing good work” and that they are supporting the organization’s efforts along with the United Nations and Europa Donna, the European Breast Cancer Coalition. They also clarified that they responded to a request for assistance from Uzbekistan’s National Breast Cancer Association and that all other organizations in Uzbekistan supporting, sponsoring, or participating in the race were selected by the Breast Cancer Association. Komen said that the bottom line for them is to help fight breast cancer, that they will support international partners who meet their standards, that they lack the capacity to police every way in which their partners market their relationship with Komen, and that they avoid getting wrapped up in politics and other causes.

Say what you will about Gulnora Karimova, but she is no fool. With her ambassadorship, honorary Ph.D., fashion line, her jewelry, and Fund Forum and its empire of legally separate charities all sharing office space, she markets herself as a glamorous, cultured philanthropist. Her efforts to forge this image get a bump when she gets featured in European magazines or partners with respected international organizations. Of course, serious aid, development, or advocacy organizations would avoid working with her and she with them, but an organization like Komen seems exactly like the kind of organization with which she would seek association. Even putting aside their recent controversies, they are a well known brand that communicates care and concern whether slapped on a bucket of chicken, a football jersey, or a charity run by a dictator’s daughter.

There is nothing to indicate that Komen is anything but credible in saying that they believe the National Breast Cancer Association of Uzbekistan to be a “credible organization doing good work” and that their one and only goal in working with them was to help women in Uzbekistan fight breast cancer. However, it is clear that associating their partnership in Uzbekistan with Gulnora is fair and the result of their lack of due diligence.

Komen’s partner in Uzbekistan, as mentioned above, is the National Breast Cancer Association of Uzbekistan. The organization is, however, a subsidiary component of another charity, Women’s Assembly, that proclaims on its main page that Gulnora plays a leading role in their projects. (Sponsors of this charity include the multinational pharmaceutical companies Novartis, Hoffman La Roche, Ebewe, and Sanofi Aventis.) It is difficult to find the Breast Cancer Association’s activities on the Women’s Assembly website, but according to Europa Donna, they have a track record raising awareness about and supporting women with breast cancer.

Women’s Assembly is one of several organizations, including Fund Forum, Mehr Nuri, and the Social Initiatives Support Fund, that are all at 80 Uzbekistan Street. The registration information for women.uz lists the same Fund Forum employee, Amir Khaidarov, as fundforum.uz as its technical and billing contact. (Mr. Khaidarov is also the contact listed for Kelajak Ovozi and Fund Forum is given for Mehr Nuri.) These could all be independent organizations that are absolutely separate… but legal documents notwithstanding, they simply are not.

Additionally, it takes little effort find Gulnora’s marks all over the Uzbekistan breast cancer walks. In a story on the 2010 walk at Fund Forum, they are described as Gulnara’s brainchild. The race is showing up in news stories and in the rotating advertisements box at Fund Forum’s front page. She lists the National Breast Cancer Association as one of the organizations with which she is affiliated on her personal page, where the walks are also described as one of her charitable activities.

The Komen representative with whom I spoke suggested the organization had no knowledge of links to Gulnora Karimova and insisted that their partnership was not with her Fund Forum. She further suggested that the ways in which the National Breast Cancer Association’s partnership with Susan G. Komen for the Cure were being portrayed in Uzbekistan and the relationships that the Association made with other Uzbek partners were beyond their ability to control. Fair enough, but it is hard for them to claim no knowledge of Fund Forum’s involvement. Unless UzDaily is fabricating the story, Fund Forum employees received training from a Komen representative in Tashkent in January. Additionally, Fund Forum is linked from Susan G. Komen for the Cure’s international races page, but only because they sometimes simply post the links their partners send them, according to Komen’s spokesperson.

There is nothing wrong with wanting to help people battle a terrible disease regardless of whether or not they live under a corrupt, oppressive regime. In fact, the story here that is more important is the one about Gulnora’s constellation of charities using a well-known western organization to bolster her legitimacy. In this instance, Komen’s chief failure was to fully vet their partner in Uzbekistan, something they said they do not have the capacity to do. More importantly though, their one and only concern is fighting breast cancer, the spokesperson told me, and this is a way for them to help out in Uzbekistan.

From the Komen representative’s reaction when talking to me, the organization appears caught entirely by surprise about the negative reactions they are receiving. Wonkette and Foreign Policy picked up the story, and the reactions to it on Twitter can be summed up with the question, “What were they thinking?”"

The answer is that they weren’t. Not about this anyway.

There is a lesson here, and it is not a new one. Especially when working in countries governed by oppressive regimes, organizations need to be aware of all the risks involved, including public relations risks. For whatever reason, Susan G. Komen for the Cure failed to fully vet its partner in Uzbekistan and assess the risks of working with them. The National Breast Cancer Association of Uzbekistan met the credibility and performance standards that Susan G. Komen for the Cure sets for its partners. But because they were unaware that the Association is associated with Gulnora Karimova and her empire of charitable organizations, that these organizations actively work to soften Gulnora’s and Uzbekistan’s international reputations, and that partnering with a Gulnora-affiliated organization would expose them to negative publicity, they were unprepared to respond to questions about Gulnora or the Fund Forum beyond insisting they are only associated with the National Breast Cancer Association, and that this is in line with their mission and standards. Had Komen for the Cure been aware of the risks, they may still have chosen to go forward. But then, they would at least have been better prepared to respond.

UPDATE: As mentioned at the bottom of this post, there is an update following my conversation with a representative from Susan G. Komen for the Cure. Due to its length, I’ve made it its own post.

As is always the case, the Uzbek media can be counted on to bring enlightening and groundbreaking coverage on the most pressing issues of the day.

Fund Forum started to sell T-shirts of charity forum-marathon “In the Name of Life” on 16 April 2012. The marathon will take place in Tashkent on 1 May. The fund said that it sold 500 T-shirts on the first day. Buying the T-shirts, people confirm their participation at the forum-marathon.

What kind of marathon might this be? Fund Forum’s website says that these shirts are for the Susan G. Komen Uzbekistan Race for the Cure. And they are not making that up at all. Fund Forum and other NGOs sharing its address and also run by Gulnora Karimov are official partners of the official Susan G. Komen for the Cure.

The agreement was inked in January and quickly followed with a training session in Tashkent. Races have been held in regions and cities throughout Uzbekistan already, with the final race scheduled for Tashkent on May 1.

There is nothing wrong with the goal of these events — encouraging annual mammograms and raising some funds to provide screenings.

However, everything about Gulnora’s charities is questionable. And even with Komen’s recent track record of making strategically poor decisions (for which it is still paying) and its slow transformation into something resembling a consultancy that helps business sell products by slapping some pink ribbons on them, the decision to partner with Gulnora’s organizations seems strange. It is, at best, ignorant and poorly thought out.

It very well may be that Fund Forum and its constellation of Gulnora-led co-tenants at 80 Uzbekistan Street in Tashkent do some good here and there. But for whatever good they might do, one of their most important functions is to paint Gulnora as a glamorous, cultured, talented, educated, respected philanthropist. The first link on Fund Forum’s website is to Gulnora’s personal page. Scattered among stories on the various charities’ events in the news section are stories on Gulnora’s glamorous house; her charm, class, beauty, elegance, and caring sensibility; her beauty, charisma, and charitable projects; and, her work organizing Tashkent fashion week.

And now with the association with Susan G. Komen for the Cure, Gulnora can pin on an OFFICIAL pink ribbon, so that the public relations work her foundations do for her can show she is not only the most glamorous philanthropist to walk the earth, but also legitimized by a well-known foreign charity as being so.

Note: I have contacted Susan G. Komen for the Cure for comment on their relationship with Fund Forum and Gulnora’s other charities. I will update this story when and if I hear from them.

I have a piece up at the Atlantic, discussing why chickens sometimes factor heavily into national politics.

Chickens are a surprising bellwether for international economic and political issues. Sounding for all the world like some modern-day Khrushchevian Red Plenty economic master plan, the Uzbek government has demanded that not only agriculture do more, but that industry reduce costs and increase production — just like that. More more more for less less less. So why the chicken handouts? …

But Uzbekistan is hardly the only country to react to a changing political climate through chickens. In the early 1990s, a collapsing Gorbachev-era Russia was experiencing food shortages and hunger. President George H.W. Bush came up with a win-win solution: give surplus U.S. chicken meat to Russia. The U.S. has an insatiable appetite for white chicken breast meat, but in the process produces far more dark chicken leg meat than it could possibly consume. President Bush took that excess and sent it to Russia. The Russians devoured it, proclaiming the beauty of such enormous drumsticks, and to this day chicken hindquarters in Russian are often called “Bush’s Legs.”

I continue, discussing the many ways chickens exemplify and, in some ways, help to explain certain political changes. Enjoy.